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Resumen
    
Este artículo analiza brevemente la manera en la cual los historiadores han estudiado la evolución de empresas 
británicas en América Latina. En los 1970s y 1980s la investigación en esta área estuvo dominada por preguntas vincula-
das al poder, al imperialismo, a la teoría de la dependencia, sin ser influenciada por temas más tradicionales de la historia 
empresarial. Estos temas más tradicionales fueron recién incorporados a partir de los 1980s, cuando historiadores comen-
zaron a tratar temas de estructura, organización y gobierno de empresas británicas en América Latina, y en particular 
cuando comenzaron a utilizar conceptos tales como ‘free-standing companies’ y ‘grupos de inversión’. Más recientemente, 
historiadores han usado conceptos de otras áreas del conocimiento tales como administración internacional de recursos 
humanos y economía política internacional, mientras que el creciente empleo de historiadores empresariales en escuelas 
de negocios y administración muy probablemente incentivará aun más el uso de tales enfoques.
Palabras claves: Empresas británicas, América Latina, historiografía, imperialismo empresarial
Abstract 
This paper briefly surveys the ways in which historians have studied the evolution of British business in Latin Ame-
rica.  In the 1970s and 1980s research was dominated by questions of power, imperialism and dependency rather than 
orthodox business history themes.  The latter made their way into the subject from the 1980s when historians began to 
address issues of structure, organisation and governance in British firms in Latin America, and in particular utilise the con-
cepts of ‘free-standing companies’ and ‘investment groups’.  More recently they have used ideas from international human 
resource management and international political economy, and the growth in the employment of business historians in 
business and management schools is likely to further encourage such approaches.
Key words: British business, Latin America, historiography, business imperialism
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Introduction
 
In 1970 I started PhD research.  ‘There’s a large archive 
belonging to a firm called the Peruvian Corporation in 
University College, London, and in Lima’, my supervisor, 
Christopher Platt, had told me several months before. 
‘That should make a good study’.  The Peruvian 
Corporation had taken over the principal railways in Peru, 
including the two highest routes in the world, in 1890, 
completed and extended them, using loans issued in 
London.  It operated them profitably until 1930, but paid 
no dividends thereafter.  Coming from a family of railway 
people (father, mother, grandfather), the topic appealed 
to me.  However, while the archives did indeed turn out 
to be large, the coverage was extremely uneven, making 
it difficult to write a conventional business history.  I soon 
broadened my research topic to encompass other British 
investments in Peru between 1885 and 1930, eventually 
producing a PhD thesis that I would prefer to forget.  
In those days universities in Britain left PhD students 
in history to get on with it.  We received no training 
in methodology or approaches to research. As an 
undergraduate at Cambridge I had attended lectures 
by Charles Wilson, author of a two-volume history of 
Unilever published in 1954, and David Joslin, who had 
written a centenary volume on the Bank of London and 
South America a few years later.  However, I did not realise 
their importance as pioneering business historians and, 
sadly, David Joslin died suddenly a couple of weeks after 
I started research.  45 years later I regret never having 
had the opportunity to ask either for advice about 
working on British firms in Latin America and writing 
business history.   At that point the field was in its infancy 
in Britain, even more so in Latin America, and for a time 
scholars in the two areas followed rather different paths.
Other business historians have praised the 
contributions of British scholars to our understanding of 
foreign business in Latin America, picking out a group 
of us who studied with Christopher Platt, together 
with colleagues like W.M. Mathew, John Mayo and 
Harold Blakemore (see, for example, Steven Topik and 
Tamás Szmrecsanyi’s introduction to a special issue 
of Enterprise & Society on Latin American business 
history in 2004).  Historians in the United States such 
as Paul Goodwin, Thomas O’Brien, and Marshall Eakin, 
together with Latin American colleagues like Luis Ortega 
and Raúl García Heras, have also made a substantial 
contribution through their use of business archives.  But 
were we writing ‘business history’ in the North Atlantic 
/ Harvard sense?  In the 1970s and 1980s all of us were 
undertaking research in the context of intense debates 
over informal imperialism and dependency, when the 
current of economic nationalism was particularly strong, 
both in policy-making circles and in academia.  Those of 
us who used archives in Latin America inevitably found 
ourselves influenced by the intellectual assumptions 
and controversies we encountered there.  How was this 
reflected in our research, and how far have we been able 
to move away from our past concerns and travel back 
towards the mainstream?  We may have helped towards 
an understanding of British business in Latin America, 
but have we really contributed that much to business 
history more generally?
The history of British business in Latin 
America 
One can distinguish three overlapping phases in the 
history of British business in Latin America.  From the 
time of independence until around 1870, the interest 
was primarily commercial.  With the opening of Latin 
American ports during the independence wars, British 
merchants – and many other Europeans and North 
Americans -- arrived in numbers, hoping to accumulate 
quick fortunes by supplying textiles and hardware 
from industrialising Britain in exchange for the massive 
resources of silver and gold that they assumed Latin 
America could produce. For the same reason British 
investors put money in the 1820s into government bonds 
and mining enterprises formed to exploit resources in 
Mexico and Peru.  However, by the end of the decade 
only Brazil was still paying interest on its debt and very 
few mining companies had survived.  Many merchants 
had disappeared as well, unable to manage the risks 
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and volatility inherent in a trade subject to lengthy 
communications lines, periodic market gluts, and 
political instability in the new republics.  However, the 
trade continued, with eager new participants alongside 
a handful of merchants who had survived the turmoil of 
the 1820s, such as MacLean Rowe (later Graham Rowe) 
and Antony Gibbs and Sons.  Indeed, the volume of 
trade expanded quite rapidly as the price of textiles fell 
and merchants found new exports to ship to Europe 
and North America: guano and wool from Peru; copper, 
silver and wheat from Chile; hides from the River Plate; 
coffee from Brazil; and sugar from Cuba.  Sterling bills 
of exchange drawn on merchants in Liverpool and the 
City of London financed much of this trade, and British 
shipping dominated.
The second phase of British interest began around 
1870, and depended on the successful renegotiation of 
the defaulted debts of the post-independence period. 
This then opened the way for new investments, both in 
public debt and in infrastructure, in response to Latin 
American demands for railway construction and, slightly 
later, the need for services in rapidly growing cities.  In 
the 1860s construction commenced on both the Buenos 
Ayres Great Southern Railway and the Central Argentine 
Railway, opening up the pampas, as well as on the 
San Paulo Railway in Brazil, which stimulated coffee 
cultivation.  British banks also began operations in 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil.  As long as Latin American 
governments could service their loans, the investment 
boom continued, but in the mid-1870s, with a succession 
of defaults, it ended abruptly.  Only Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay retained their credit.  In trade, many 
British merchants shifted their attention increasingly 
to agricultural, pastoral and mineral exports.  Several 
utilised their local expertise and their transatlantic 
connections to float new companies to eager (and often 
gullible) investors in Britain, one example being that of 
Gibbs in the nitrate industry.  New investment arrived 
as savers regained confidence, in particular in the 1880s 
and after 1900.  By 1914 hundreds of British companies 
were operating in Latin America, especially in Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile.  Latin America as a whole took only a 
tenth of British exports, but accounted for a quarter of 
British overseas investment.  British-owned institutions 
were visible in all the major cities: in the extreme case of 
Montevideo, residents obtained their gas and water from 
British firms, used British-owned tramways and trains to 
get to work, and deposited their savings in British banks.
 
The outbreak of war in 1914 proved to be a watershed, 
although it took a generation for most of the older 
British interests to succumb.  The war gave US exporters 
an enormous opportunity, and although they remained 
concerned that British strength in finance, intermediary 
services, telecommunications and shipping would lead 
to recovery after the peace, in practice this happened 
only partially.  British traders found the inter-war period 
difficult for a number of reasons: their government gave 
preference to imperial producers after 1932; the British 
stock market was largely closed to new ventures due 
to the need to protect sterling; British exports became 
uncompetitive in price and quality; companies became 
subject to higher levels of taxation; and the retirement 
and death of partners took capital out of the business. 
Many of the British investments in railways and public 
utilities faced increasing opposition from nationalists, 
making it difficult for them to raise tariffs and thus 
generate the profits to reinvest to meet the growing 
demand for services.  After 1930 very few British-owned 
railways paid dividends, as exchange depreciation and 
competition from road transport caused their sterling 
revenue to fall.  Several governments acquired the assets 
of the railway companies after World War II; meanwhile 
US multinationals purchased several independent 
electricity and telephone firms, while host governments 
took over other utilities companies.  British banks in Latin 
America also ran into difficulties: the Bank of England 
organised the rescue of the Anglo South American Bank 
in 1931, and eventually persuaded the Bank of London 
and South America (BOLSA) to absorb it five years later.
 
British investments did not disappear from Latin 
America, however.  After twenty years of stagnation 
and conservative management, the Bank of London 
and South America adopted a rather more aggressive 
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strategy in the late 1950s.  Meanwhile, leading industrial 
firms such as ICI, Unilever and J. & P. Coats invested in 
manufacturing, initially and primarily in Argentina and 
Brazil (from the 1920s onwards), but also in medium-
sized economies like Chile, Peru and Colombia from the 
1950s.  Royal Dutch Shell retained a strong presence in oil 
production in Venezuela until 1975, and in refining and 
distribution elsewhere.  BP later invested in Colombia.  In 
many countries privatisation and economic liberalisation 
from the 1980s attracted a new wave of British firms.  HSBC 
made acquisitions in Argentina, Brazil, Central America, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.  This raises a series of 
currently unresearched questions about the reasons for 
new investment, the management issues British firms 
faced in the Latin American environment, and their 
performance.  Many, but not all, British investments in 
manufacturing in Latin America had disappeared by the 
end of the century, in line with the general collapse in 
British industrial competitiveness, and both Lloyds Bank 
and HSBC withdrew from the region, but the reasons 
why are poorly understood.
Writing the history of British 
business in Latin America 
The First Phase: Imperialism and Dependency
Many business historians in Britain would regard 
Charles Wilson’s history of Unilever as the first ‘academic’ 
business history in the country.  Though commissioned 
by the firm, it took an analytical and objective view 
of its history on the basis of its extensive archives, in 
this respect contrasting with many of the celebratory, 
positivistic volumes that had previously characterised 
the field.  At much the same time an amateur historian, 
Wallis Hunt, produced a detailed two-volume history of 
Balfour Williamson, the merchant house that employed 
him.  However, the first academic history of a British 
company operating in Latin America was probably David 
Joslin’s commissioned history of BOLSA, published in 
1963.  Given full access to the firm’s extensive archives, 
Joslin found it difficult to do them justice in a couple of 
hundred pages, leaving much for historians of individual 
countries to follow up (in fact, very few have).  His book 
also did not venture beyond 1936 when BOLSA took 
over the Anglo South American Bank.
By the mid-1960s, therefore, one could identify two 
different approaches to the history of British business 
in Latin America.  Some analysed a multinational 
firm’s operations in Argentina and Brazil in the context 
of its overall strategy and operations, as Wilson had 
done.  Other professional historians followed in this 
track, providing interesting details but without full 
consideration of the Latin American environment and 
the specific problems of doing business in the region. 
Good examples include W.J. Reader on ICI, Theo Barker 
on Pilkington, Wilson’s volume on Unilever after World 
War II (and Geoffrey Jones’s subsequent work on the firm 
after 1965), Howard Cox on British American Tobacco, 
R.P.T Davenport-Hines and Judy Slinn’s volume on Glaxo 
before 1962, and Richard Roberts on Schroders.  A 
different approach might have been to write company 
histories of firms operating almost totally in Latin 
America, as Joslin had done, but very few publications of 
this type appeared until the 1980s, when W.M. Mathew 
produced an updated version of his PhD thesis on Gibbs’ 
role in the guano trade, followed by Marshall Eakin on St 
John d’El Rey, a gold-mining firm with operations in Brazil, 
and Harold Blakemore on the Ferrocarril Antofagasta y 
Bolivia.  A third possibility would be to compare firms 
within the same economic sector, but little work of this 
kind appeared except for Paul Goodwin and Colin Lewis 
on British-owned railways in Argentina, and the relevant 
sections of work on the oil industry.
 
Rather than writing ‘orthodox’ business history, focusing 
on the strategy, management and performance of the 
firm, historians instead concentrated on two current 
and linked controversies, over informal imperialism 
and dependency or, in other words, on business-
state relations and the economic and social impact 
of British firms in Latin America.  In part the stimulus 
was academic: the early work of H.S. Ferns on ‘informal 
imperialism’ in Argentina and Ronald Robinson and John 
Gallagher’s well-known formulation of the ‘imperialism 
of free trade’, both of which dated from the early 1950s. 
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Although he had started his own research within the 
‘modernisation’ paradigm current in the early 1960s, a US 
historian, Richard Graham, also located himself within 
this critical tradition.  Together with nationalist, Marxist 
and dependency writers in Latin America, this approach 
created a negative image of British businessmen’s 
interventions in politics and long-term impact on the 
region’s development, succinctly and influentially 
summarised in André Gunder Frank’s Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America at the end of the 
1960s.  
However, very few radical writers actually consulted 
British business archives, as D.C.M. (Christopher) Platt 
pointed out in a scathing review of Richard Graham’s 
work in 1971.  While Platt rarely did archival research 
himself (with the exception of some later work on 
Barings), he was instrumental in persuading others to 
do so, having undertaken a commissioned survey of 
archives available on British business in Latin America in 
the mid-1960s.  Much of the resulting research in Britain, 
summarised in a book that Platt edited in 1977, took a 
much more sceptical position on British businessmen’s 
power vis-à-vis Latin American governments and 
business elites than writers in Latin America and in 
the dependency tradition assumed.  Other historians, 
like Luis Ortega, Thomas O’Brien, and Steven Topik, 
also found the archives leading them to a much more 
nuanced view of the role played by the British. 
 
Research on the British in Chile, where three topics 
dominated, offers a good example of how the 
imperialism/dependency debate affected research.  First, 
the centenary of the outbreak of the War of the Pacific in 
1879 stimulated work on the role British business had 
played in its origins.  Many recalled the remark of James 
Blaine, US secretary of state, that it was ‘an English war 
upon Peru, with Chili as the instrument’, ascribing it to 
bondholders annoyed with Peru’s default in 1876 (New 
York Times, 27 April 1882).  In addition, Peru had partly 
nationalised the incipient nitrate industry which, Blaine 
hinted, the British would like to control.  In fact, research 
in the Gibbs and Foreign Office archives by historians 
such as O’Brien, Mayo and Ortega showed that the 
prime advocates of war were the majority Chilean 
owners of the Antofagasta company and an influential 
group of Chilean politicians, who then took the decision 
to privatise the industry and impose an export duty 
on it in order to impede problems with the Peruvian 
bondholders and other claimants.  
Second, debate took place over British business 
involvement in the 1891 Civil War where an influential 
Chilean Marxist historian, Hernán Ramírez Necochea had 
argued that British nitrate firms had actively supported 
the opposition to President Balmaceda.  Harold 
Blakemore, in contrast, drew attention to the divisions 
within British business.  Gibbs, one of the leading firms in 
the industry, opposed Colonel North and the monopoly 
he sought for his Nitrate Railways Company.  In the 
absence of North’s archives following the collapse of his 
business empire, resolution of this debate is unlikely, 
but the consensus among historians is that internal 
Chilean conflicts provide the primary explanation for 
the war, even if individual British interests supported 
and financed the rebels.  
A third area of research again focused on the question 
of collusion among British firms against the interests 
of the Chilean state through the formation of nitrate 
‘combinations’ to control overproduction and support 
prices.  Using the Gibbs archives, in particular, Robert 
Greenhill came to the conclusion that the combinations 
tended to fail, and that both the state and the salitreros 
eventually preferred cooperation to confrontation. 
Again, though, the emphasis came to be on business-
state relations and the question of ‘control’ rather than 
the internal dynamics of the industry and the strategies 
and management of the firms involved.  Little of this 
work, therefore, was of relevance to mainstream business 
historians, however careful the research and however 
valuable it was to specialists in Latin American history.
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The Second Phase: Business Structures
As mainstream research on the evolution of multinationals 
proceeded in the 1980s, it became evident that many 
British investments in Latin America before 1914 differed 
markedly from the ‘typical’ multinational expanding 
outwards from a solid domestic market position into a 
number of overseas countries.  Two important theoretical 
contributions in the late 1980s put this anomaly into 
perspective and provided the concepts that would allow 
historians of British business to reconsider the structures 
and organisation of British direct investments in Latin 
America after 1870.  
First, arising from his work on the growth of merchant 
banks in the City of London, Stanley Chapman proposed 
the concept of ‘investment groups’ where a single 
financial house committed itself to a range of long-term 
investments overseas.  He provided three examples 
familiar to historians of Latin America: Antony Gibbs 
& Sons, with investments both in various sectors in 
Chile and in Australia; Balfour Williamson, which had 
investments in North America as well as Chile and Peru); 
and Knowles & Foster, which controlled flour milling, 
textiles and shipping companies in Brazil.  
Second, Mira Wilkins developed the concept of the 
‘free-standing company’, defined as a firm with a small 
headquarters in the City of London and the bulk of its 
assets and employees in one overseas country.  She 
argued that this was a distinctive form of international 
business designed to match abundant British capital 
with the security of British management and potentially 
profitable opportunities overseas: such companies were 
nominally independent, but might form part of broader 
clusters centred on individuals or firms with particular 
trading, technological or legal/accounting expertise. 
Wilkins believed most free-standing companies to be 
short-lived, partly because they did not incorporate 
either the technical or the management capabilities that 
characterised successful multinational firms.
‘Investment groups’ were certainly characteristic of much 
British enterprise in the 1870-1914 boom.  Promoters 
like Gibbs and Colonel John North, the ‘Nitrate King’, 
put together clusters of firms that they floated on the 
Stock Exchange, retaining control of management and 
hence valuable agencies.  The ‘free-standing company’ 
certainly fitted firms like the major British railway 
companies in Argentina and Brazil, or public utilities in 
Latin American cities, as well as many mining enterprises. 
Latin American specialists, however, qualified some 
of Wilkins’ conclusions.  Charles Jones argued against 
her assumption that free-standing companies were 
generally short-lived due to weak governance, drawing 
attention to the sector- and country-specific knowledge 
that a relatively small number of investors in Latin 
America were able to exploit to obtain concessions, 
float, and maintain control over such companies.  In 
addition, he distinguished autonomous, professionally 
managed free-standing companies from merchant-
based investment groups, listing fourteen of the latter 
in Brazil, the River Plate and the west coast.  At much 
the same time, looking more closely at Chile and Peru, 
I also distinguished between autonomous free-standing 
companies and those that formed part of investment 
groups, suggesting that the rapid turnover of mining 
companies should not obscure the longevity of other 
firms like the British-owned railways and banks.
The introduction of these concepts might have brought 
Latin America back into the mainstream of business 
history, since they raised issues such as strategy, 
organisation, corporate governance, the importance 
of networks, tacit knowledge and transaction costs, 
and the long-term problems of survival.  However, 
for the most part, questions of strategy, structure, 
governance and management remain unexplored for 
many British firms.  This is certainly the case for Chile, 
despite the publication of Harold Blakemore’s study of 
the Antofagasta (Chili) and Bolivia Railway Company, a 
classic free-standing company, in 1989.  Thus we have 
no detailed study of how Gibbs managed and exploited 
their interests along the nitrate value chain (as owners, 
managing and commercial agents, traders on their 
own account, and distributors in Europe), although 
Juan Ricardo Couyoumdjian sheds important insights 
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on their role during World War I and both Thomas 
O’Brien and Alejandro Soto-Cárdenas use their archives 
to examine their decline afterwards.  The dominance 
that three British merchant firms exercised over flour-
milling in Chile remains unexplored.  There is no book-
length study of those of North‘s companies that became 
autonomous when his investment group disintegrated 
after his death.  Thus the history of the Nitrate Railways 
Company, apart from a brief article by Ian Thomson, 
remains largely unknown, and few historians have 
researched in the archives of the Anglo South American 
Bank since Joslin.
The Third Phase: Connecting International 
Business, International Political Economy and 
Business History
In the last twenty years the nature of mainstream 
business history has itself changed, as it has moved away 
from Chandler’s emphasis on strategy and structure and 
his assumption that, because most British firms did not 
conform to the organisational forms that he detected in 
large US corporations, they were necessarily inefficient. 
Many historians prefer an approach other than that of 
the single-company history.  Instead, they have turned 
to different themes, some of which are relevant to the 
history of British business in Latin America in general, 
and Chile in particular.  This has meant the growing 
incorporation of theoretical insights from other areas of 
history or from fields such as international business and 
international political economy.
The growth of labour history in Latin America in 
the 1970s and 1980s paid particular attention to the 
experience and organisation of local workers employed 
by the British, especially since companies like the 
railways were often among the largest employers and 
became the cradles of modern trade unions.  In the case 
of the nitrate industry a number of important studies, by 
authors like Charles Bergquist, appeared.  They argued 
that, especially in the early stages of the industry, many 
nitrate companies exploited their workers through high 
prices at company stores, and attempted consistently to 
impede labour organisation on the nitrate pampa and in 
the ports.  In this they resembled foreign firms in other 
countries which cultivated close relations with local 
government officials and police chiefs, targeted those 
they identified as ‘agitators’, and exploited ethnic and 
national divisions among workers.  However, historians 
have paid less attention to the expatriate technical 
and managerial staff on whom British firms relied.  In 
an important section of his book on British overseas 
banks, Geoffrey Jones outlined the ways in which they 
socialised their contract staff into the local expatriate 
and company culture when they first arrived, thus 
reinforcing the control that senior managers in Latin 
America and London could exercise.  This echoed earlier 
research by a Norwegian historian, Gudmund Stang, on 
the employment practices of British-owned railways 
in Argentina.  However, neither of these two historians 
utilised insights from the literature on international 
human resources management, an approach that I 
attempted in considering a later period in Argentina and 
Chile when the most successful British firms made the 
transition to using local managers at a senior level.
International political economy (IPE) can also provide 
insights.  Although historians invented the concept of 
the ‘commodity chain’, the bulk of the literature that 
developed on this and the related concept of the ‘global 
value chain’ in the 1990s and early 2000s concentrated 
on contemporary commodities and global production 
networks.  An exception was a collaborative project 
on commodity chains in Latin American economic 
history which contained a chapter on the guano and 
nitrate trades, in which British firms predominated. 
One key point that arose from this was the importance 
of knowledge and experience, market information, 
and networks along the entire commodity chain: their 
exploitation of these intangible assets helps to explain 
Gibbs’ continued predominance in the Chilean nitrate 
trade until the 1920s.  
With the passing of the debates over informal 
imperialism and dependency and the distortions in 
research that they produced, IPE approaches can also 
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provide insights into the negotiations that occurred 
between British firms and host governments.  In the case 
of Colombian oil, for example, Marcelo Bucheli shows 
the boundaries to the British firms’ knowledge and 
information in an unfamiliar environment, and how their 
poor analysis of competitors’ objectives and local politics 
allowed US firms to dominate the industry.   In contrast, 
the same British entrepreneur, Weetman Pearson, 
was able to gain a leading position in the Mexican oil 
industry as a result of the local knowledge and networks 
his firm had built up through public works contracting. 
The potential for combining theoretical IPE approaches 
and empirical research is also evident in a paper on 
political risk by Mark Casson and Teresa da Silva Lopes, 
though it contains little in detail on Latin America.  My 
own current research, with Robert Greenhill, looks at the 
crisis of the Chilean nitrate industry in the Depression 
of the early 1930s, taking a stakeholder approach and 
trying to analyse the perceptions of participants in the 
trade, and the way in which these help to explain how 
they interpreted and responded to the sudden crisis that 
enveloped the industry in 1928-29, and thus impeded 
collective action to resist competition.
Conclusions
For a long time, from the 1960s to at least the 1980s, 
and in some circles even now, the debates over informal 
imperialism and dependency helped to frame research 
on British firms in Latin America.  As a result ‘orthodox’ 
company histories were rare until the mid-1980s, 
despite the path-breaking work of historians like David 
Joslin.  Empirical research on British firms helped to 
show the limits to both their economic and political 
power, but left unanswered key questions about the 
circumstances – in terms of domestic politics and the 
strategies of competitors – in which they could extract 
concessions and advantages from host governments. 
No-one applied Raymond Vernon’s concept of the 
‘obsolescing bargain’ to British firms. A further problem 
with the research stimulated by these debates was 
that it tended to stop in 1914, without considering in 
much depth the extent to which British businessmen, 
in combination with their home government, were able 
to contribute to (and profit from) the war effort.  Recent 
research by Philip Dehne has helped to throw light on 
this, as did earlier work by Couyoumdjian on the case of 
Chile.  However, much of the work on the period since 
World War I has concentrated on the specific case of the 
Argentine railway nationalisation.  Historians still have 
much to do to explain the decline of British business in 
Latin America, and the exceptionality of those that have 
survived, grown, and remained profitable.
 
Nevertheless, as a result of theoretical insights from 
historians with other specialisms, we now have a much 
better understanding of the way in which British business 
in Latin America between the 1870s and the interwar 
period was organised, in the form of free-standing 
companies, often clustered together into investment 
groups, and thus differed from the ‘classic’ multinational 
firm.  As business history has changed its focus, too, new 
possibilities are opening up.  One feature of the recent 
past has been the employment of business historians 
in business schools rather than history departments, 
exposing them to a wider range of theoretical insights.  
The so-called ‘historical turn’ in organisation studies is 
helping to encourage work on international firms, and 
critical management theory questions orthodox readings 
of archival evidence.  Leading business historians like 
Geoffrey Jones have called for a much greater intellectual 
interchange between specialists in international business 
and business history.  IPE specialists have developed 
insights into questions of political risk and negotiation 
strategies that historians might use to reconsider some 
of the key aspects of the history of British firms in Latin 
America.  There is still much scope for ‘traditional’ 
corporate history, however; those engaging in the 
debates over informal imperialism and dependency 
largely ignored this approach, and many archives remain 
largely untapped.
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